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The People’s Justice? 
David Fontana 
Over the past few decades, the liberal Justices on the Supreme Court have made 
their most notable extrajudicial communications about the Constitution in academic 
venues discussing academic issues. This has limited their appeal to broader audiences. 
In this Essay, Professor David Fontana explores the distinctive path that Justice 
Sotomayor has pursued during her first five years on the Court. Justice Sotomayor has 
spoken to academic audiences, as past liberal Justices have. What is most notable 
about Justice Sotomayor, though, is that she has also appeared in locations and 
addressed issues that make her and what she discusses of broader appeal; that gives her 
the potential, as this Essay discusses, to become the “People’s Justice.” Justice 
Sotomayor thus may make liberal perspectives on the Constitution more known, more 
liked, and more comprehensible. For those concerned with pursuing a liberal vision of 
the Constitution, this could be an important development. 
introduction  
No moment better represented why Justice Sonia Sotomayor could be a 
different kind of Supreme Court Justice than the events of the Sunday before 
the second presidential inauguration. Vice President Joseph Biden selected her 
to administer his oath of office. Justices often play a role during inaugurations, 
from administering oaths to sitting among other dignitaries in the audience. 
This time was different, though: Sotomayor agreed to administer the oath to 
Vice President Biden, but requested that she do so early in the day so she could 
attend a book signing event open to the general public that afternoon at Barnes 
& Noble in New York City.1 This moment illustrated what has made Justice 
Sotomayor unique on the Court during her first five years: Her role as the first 
publicly affiliated liberal Justice during the past generation to use the unique 
opportunities Justices have to communicate outside of their judicial opinions 
with average Americans.  
                                                
1. See David G. Savage & Michael A. Memoli, Sotomayor Scheduling Conflict Leads to Biden’s 
Early Swearing-In, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/18/news 
/la-pn-sotomayor-biden-inauguration-20130118.  
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Liberal Justices during the past few decades2 have used their 
communications outside of their opinions—what this Essay will call 
“extrajudicial communications”—to play the role of what we might call the 
“Academic’s Justice.” The content and locations of their extrajudicial 
communications have been most notable for their academic, intellectual, and 
technical nature. Their most significant appearances have been at universities, 
law school moot courts, law school lectures, or meetings of elite bar 
associations. Their writings have been focused on the law as an academic 
exercise. The public coverage of the Justices on the left side of the 
jurisprudential spectrum has mirrored this, often focusing on the liberal need 
to find an “intellectual counterweight”3 to conservative Justices.4  
This academic audience is important for liberal Justices, but the audience 
for liberal Justices is plural, not singular. By focusing too much on academic 
topics before academic audiences, liberal Justices have not used their 
extrajudicial communications to reach broader audiences. 
 What makes Sotomayor potentially different is her ability to fix this—to 
serve as the “People’s Justice”5 instead of the “Academic’s Justice.” Sotomayor 
                                                
2. I will include in this list Justice David Souter (appointed by a Republican President but a 
reliable liberal vote for most of his career). I will also include Justice John Paul Stevens, who 
was not appointed during this time period but became a reliable liberal vote during this 
period, as well as the three other Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents: Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Cf. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1455-56 
tbl. 8 (2013) (referencing these Justices as “liberals”). The other liberal Justices on the Court 
during this period had either largely stopped their public communications by the time the 
1990s started (Harry Blackmun) or had not been publicly affiliated with the liberal cause for 
some time (Byron White). The Essay is limited to recent history because it is the most 
relevant to what is transpiring now and will transpire in the future, and it is the time period 
when conservative Justices first comprehensively “went public” with their constitutional 
arguments. See, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: 
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 10-11 (2008). 
3. Adam Cohen, Editorial Observer: Justice Breyer Proposes a New Path for the Post-Rehnquist 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/26/opinion/26mon4 
.html (emphasis added). 
4. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 91-92 (2012) (“‘It takes a theory to beat a theory and, after a decade of trying, 
the opponents of originalism have never converged on an appealing and practical 
alternative.’” (quoting RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92 (2004))); Cass Sunstein, The Philosopher-Justice, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 2005 (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)) (“At last there has appeared a direct and substantial 
challenge . . . to the constitutional thought of Justice Antonin Scalia . . . .”). 
5. The reference here is, of course, to the phrase popularized during Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s remarks about the late Princess Diana. See Blair Pays Tribute to Princess Diana, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/diana/blairreact.html (last visited Feb. 19, 
2014) (“They liked her, they loved her, they regarded her as one of the people.”). 
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has made her share of appearances at academic institutions like law schools and 
has discussed academic topics.6 More notably, though, Sotomayor has made a 
large number of appearances at events geared toward other audiences. If the 
medium is the message, then part of what makes Sotomayor different is where 
she is appearing. Sotomayor has used these appearances (and her best-selling 
book7) to discuss her life—and the law—in a less academic fashion.  
By appearing in different places and talking about the law in a different 
language, Sotomayor has the potential to be a new kind of liberal Justice by 
appealing to broader audiences. Her fame might bring new followers to the 
liberal cause.  Her humanity might make them appreciate the liberal cause even 
more. And her language might make the liberal cause sound different—and 
more appealing to a broader range of audiences.8  
There is an emerging academic literature about the relevance of these 
audiences to what the Supreme Court does.9 If members of the general public 
are convinced by what Justices say in their public appearances, they might play 
a role (via public opinion polls) in influencing what types of federal judges or 
Supreme Court Justices can be nominated or approved.10 If members of the 
general public are convinced by what Justices say in their public appearances, 
that could even play a direct role in influencing how Justices might decide later 
                                                
6. Because the number of appearances that the Justices have made is large, I have instead 
provided an illustrative list of appearances. Particularly since so much of their tenure was 
before the Internet, and because there is no other database about the public appearances by 
Justices, this Essay makes “no claim to systematicity or comprehensiveness” by capturing 
every public appearance. David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government 
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 520 n.21 
(2013). Instead, the examples are meant to “add sufficient texture to merit mention, 
notwithstanding their evident limitations.” Id. 
7. See SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD (2013). 
8. There has been some media discussion of Sotomayor’s public appearances, but it has not 
considered their significance, their originality, and their long-term implications. See Jodi 
Kantor, On Book-Tour Circuit, Sotomayor Sees a New Niche for a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/04/us/politics/book-tour-rock-star-sotomayor-sees 
-an-even-higher-calling.htm. Parts of the argument made here about Justice Sotomayor 
were briefly previewed in David Fontana, Sonia Sotomayor: How She Became the Public Face of 
the Supreme Court’s Liberal Wing, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, June 29, 2011, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/91013/sonia-sotomayor-supreme-court-liberal 
-voice.  
9. For some helpful examples, see Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and 
Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 
Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 110 (2008); TELES, 
supra note 2. 
10. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 
385. 
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cases.11 This literature suggests that what Sotomayor can offer liberals might be 
particularly useful. 
This is a short Essay, but some caveats are still important: This Essay is 
limited to the strategic significance of Justice Sotomayor’s role as the first 
Justice conventionally classified as a liberal in the past generation to 
communicate so often to lay audiences.  It could be that her public outreach is 
significant for the entire Supreme Court, and not just for liberals, but that is 
beyond the scope of this Essay.12 Being a true “People’s Justice” might require a 
decisional jurisprudence and an opinion-writing style in addition to a public 
presence. The focus of this Essay is on the extrajudicial dimension of her tenure 
on the Court—and the tenure of other liberal Justices—because that is where 
Sotomayor has been the most different, original, and influential in filling gaps 
left by other liberal Justices. If conservative Justices have been “selling 
originalism,”13 Justice Sotomayor could help liberals sell their constitutional 
theory.14 
i .  the audiences for liberal justices  
Liberal Justices have several different constituencies that could be helpful 
supporters of their causes, and that they therefore have an interest in 
cultivating. Academics and others with an academic interest in the law are a key 
constituency for Justices, particularly for liberals. But other legal and political 
elites and activists—and the hundreds of millions of other Americans—are also 
key, non-academic constituencies for the Supreme Court. 
Scholars are just starting to develop accounts of why public 
communications matter for Supreme Court Justices. In political science, the 
                                                
11. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? 
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 263 (2010) (“When the 
‘mood of the public’ is liberal (conservative), the Court is significantly more likely to issue 
liberal (conservative) decisions.”).  
12. If this were the focus, though, it would be more complicated, because at least Justice 
Antonin Scalia among the conservative Justices has engaged in extensive and quite effective 
public outreach. See, e.g., Guinier, supra note 9, at 120 (highlighting how oral dissents can 
likewise play this important communicative role); id. at 110 (“Justice Scalia has 
mastered . . . . reach[ing] out to the people. He speaks frankly, memorably, and with 
absolute certainty about the very meaning of our democracy.”). Justice Thomas used his 
autobiography to engage in outreach somewhat comparable to what Justice Sotomayor has 
done. In her desire to communicate to wider audiences, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor could 
be a wonderful analogue to Justice Sotomayor.  
13. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009). 
14. For the purposes of this short contribution focusing just on the strategic values of Justice 
Sotomayor’s extrajudicial communications, I will also largely bracket some of the larger, 
normative questions about whether Justices should be appearing in public in this fashion. 
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importance for the President and Congress of “go[ing] public”15 has been a 
major topic of discussion,16 and scholars have started to examine foreign 
constitutional courts going public.17 The importance of public communications 
for Justices has proven to be more controversial.18  
While the few scholars to discuss these public communications have largely 
(with some notable exceptions19) focused on the judicial opinion,20 either 
written or oral, extrajudicial communications are arguably even more 
important. We do not have comprehensive data on the issue, but because of the 
broader media coverage and ease of comprehension of the topics, these 
extrajudicial communications could be an even more potent form of public 
communication.21 Regardless, the reasons public communication through 
                                                
15. Jeffrey K. Staton, Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results, 50 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 98, 98 (2006) (“In presidential studies, the ability to go public is considered 
among the chief executive’s most powerful tools.”).  
16. On the presidency and public communications, see, for instance, Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, 
The Politics of Presidential Press Conferences, 41 AM. POL. RES. 471 (2013); and Lyn Ragsdale, 
The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 971 (1984). On the 
Congress, see, for instance, Timothy E. Cook, The Negotiation of Newsworthiness, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 11 (Ann N. Crigler ed., 1996). On the 
bureaucracy, see, for instance, Daniel P. Carpenter, Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, 
and FDA Drug Approval, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (2002). 
17. See JEFFREY K. STATON, JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO 
(2010); GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY (2009). 
18. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563 (2009) (arguing that 
these public communications do not matter). Note that there are many features of 
Rosenberg’s account that might make us question whether his is a general account of public 
communications by the Justices. First, there is more to the public communications of the 
Justices than just “the language of judicial opinions.” Id. at 564. Second, the studies on the 
empirical impact of public communications—apart from compliance with judicial 
outcomes—are limited, meaning there is not much direct empirical information to support 
the account that Rosenberg might be understood to make at his broadest. See Staton, supra 
note 15, at 98 (“[S]cholars largely ignore the interest high court judges take in shaping 
public information.”). In part, this is because the evidence about the Justices’ public 
activities, which this Essay presents in summary form, is not generally available and/or 
compiled and examined by scholars. For a notable exception, see Lawrence Baum & Neal 
Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 
1539 tbl.1 (2010). 
19. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 566 (2006) (referencing at different points “the 
rousing talks that Thomas and Scalia routinely give to organized political constituencies”); 
Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1399, 1408 (2009) (highlighting “speeches” by conservative Justices in particular). 
20. See Post & Siegel, supra note 19, at 566-67 (“We mean . . . to call attention to the way in 
which these Justices use their judicial opinions as conscious tools to . . . fan the fires of 
political mobilization.”). 
21. See Guinier, supra note 9, at 14 (highlighting how oral dissents can reach broader audiences 
for similar reasons). 
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judicial opinions might matter are similar to the reasons extrajudicial 
communications might matter.  
Public communication by Justices can persuade other legal and political 
actors, as well as members of the general public. Justices can provide 
“authority, legitimation and status”22 for existing constitutional arguments. 
Justices can make the implausible into the plausible, by “mov[ing] otherwise 
marginal ideas into the intellectual mainstream.”23 In addition to the persuasion 
of others, public communication by Justices can motivate. Not only can 
preferences be altered, but preferences can also be made more intense. Justices 
can “inspire[] and motivate[] the claims of politically engaged agents.”24 This 
motivation can facilitate organization and the provision of labor and other 
forms of material support for causes consistent with the messages of the 
Justices.  
A. The Academic Audience for Liberal Justices 
For all Justices—but particularly for liberal Justices—academic audiences 
are crucially important. It may be the case that the opposite of what makes 
other audiences interested makes academics interested.25 A focus on the 
complexity that comes from larger, less practical issues addressed using a 
technical language tends to mark the social space of the academic world.26 
Academic communication is frequently characterized by a sense of exclusion 
and exclusivity. It takes place in locations where entry is socially restricted, and 
focuses on content that not everyone can understand.27  
Academic discussions can therefore be identified by their more exclusive 
location and content. To communicate with academic audiences, it is best to go 
to the kinds of exclusive settings where the academically inclined are located—
universities, law school moot courts, law school lecture series, or national, elite 
bar association gatherings that feature more academic discussions. Given these 
exclusive settings, and these exclusive audiences, the content of these 
                                                
22. See Post & Siegel, supra note 19, at 589. 
23. Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political 
Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 67 (2009). 
24. Robert Post, Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on the Law/Politics Distinction 
in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89 B.U. L. REV. 581, 581 (2009). 
25. See Andrew Abbott, Status and Status Strain in the Professions, 86 AM. J. SOC. 819 (1981) 
(highlighting this feature of specialized professions like the academic profession). 
26. See id. at 822. 
27. See, e.g., Robert J. Brym, Sociology of Intellectuals, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES  (James D. Wright ed., 2d. ed. 2015), http://projects 
.chass/utoronto.ca/brym/intellectuals.pdf (forthcoming) (focusing on exclusion as a 
historically central feature of academic life, including in the modern university).  
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conversations tends to be more academic as well. The conversation is more 
likely to be focused on issues like originalism or judicial restraint—the more 
technical and therefore more exclusive subject matters of academic legal 
discussions.28 
Academics are an important audience for Justices because they are an 
attentive audience, with the time and leisure to follow the Court.29 Academics 
have incentives to critique the Court. Academics who make important 
arguments regarding the work of the Court—for instance, John Hart Ely’s 
book justifying the work of the Warren Court30—will receive professional 
acclaim in the legal community for their insights.  
For liberals, academics have played a particularly crucial role for at least the 
past few decades. Liberals dominate law faculties.31 Law professors have held 
important roles in Democratic administrations.32 Law professors have been 
instrumental in the creation and operation of liberal legal organizations that 
have been “rising to power,”33 like the American Constitution Society for Law 
and Policy.34 
There are also other lawyers who might take a more academic approach to 
the Supreme Court, and thus might helpfully be grouped within this 
“academic” audience. The emergence of a “Supreme Court bar,” for instance, 
has meant that lawyers who follow the big theories as well as the small details 
that the Justices care about might fare better in the cases they brief and argue to 
                                                
28. See Abbott, supra note 25, at 825 (highlighting the “discourse norms” of academic 
environments). 
29. See Neil Gross & Scott Frickel, A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements, 70 AM. 
SOC. REV. 204, 215-16 (2005) (highlighting how academics use their differential flexibility). 
30. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). See 
also Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (noting that “Ely’s theory of judicial review [is] rooted in the 
Warren Court years”). 
31. See John L. McGinnis, Matthew Schwartz & Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and Implications 
of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1169 (2005). 
32. See Erin Geiger Smith, Law Professors from Across the Land Serving in Obama Administration, 
BUS. INSIDER, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-administration 
-takes-law-professors-from-all-over-2009-9#ixzz2om7eJv3s. 
33. Charlie Savage, Liberal Legal Group is Following New Administration’s Path to Power, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/us/politics/11network.html. 
34. Note that two law professors, Peter Rubin and Walter Dellinger, founded ACS and some of 
its major publications have been edited by law professors and primarily featured 
contributions by law professors. See THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel eds., 2009); KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (Goodwin Liu, Pamela S. 
Karlan & Christopher H. Schroeder eds., 2010). 
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the Court.35 Many of the members of the Supreme Court bar are former Court 
clerks36 or otherwise clerked for federal judges who closely follow the main 
theories about the Court. 
The academic audience is an important one not just because it listens, but 
also because of what it can do with what it hears. Academics play a crucial role 
in influencing whether what the Justices are saying is persuasive or not by 
defining the acceptable boundaries of constitutional arguments. Defining what 
constitutional arguments are “off the wall” or “on the wall” is important,37 and 
academics can play a crucial role in defining whether Justices’ comments are 
“off the wall” or “on the wall.” Academics can take not just to the law reviews 
but also to the halls of Congress or the opinion pages of newspapers to criticize 
or praise what the Justices are saying. 
Academic audiences can also help the public comments by Justices be more 
motivating and therefore more mobilizing. Academics can draw attention to 
comments by the Justices by writing about what they are saying, thereby 
generating recognition and status for members of the Court. Consider, for 
instance, the significant quantity of legal scholarship devoted to originalism, 
conferring status on Justice Scalia as an important Justice because of his 
interest in originalism.38  
If law professors are persuaded by what the Justices say, they can serve as a 
“support structure”39 for the Justices—defending them in academic and 
popular writing and in teaching the next generation of lawyers. Justices may 
also motivate those who are academically inclined but are not law professors to 
bring cases to help the Justices advance their constitutional agendas. If Justices 
persuade these lawyers, they might present in their brief or oral argument the 
precise arguments that the Justices themselves articulated in their extrajudicial 
communications. 
                                                
35. See, e.g., KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON 
COMMUNITY (1993); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme 
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008). 
36. William E. Nelson et al., The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, 
and Reincarnation?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1780-82 (2009). 
37. Cf. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 9, at 948 (discussing how redefining what arguments are 
considered acceptable and unacceptable plays a crucial role in generating or preventing 
constitutional change). 
38. For an example, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
39. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS 
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 44-71 (1998). 
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B. The Other Audiences for Liberal Justices 
Democratic Party politicians face a similar dilemma to that faced by liberal 
Justices: their supporters tend to be found among the most academically elite, 
but also the least academically elite.40 Consider, for instance, the last two 
Presidents elected from the Democratic Party: one was a Rhodes Scholar and 
Yale Law School graduate who served as a part-time law professor before 
entering political office. The other was the President of the Harvard Law 
Review and also a part-time law professor before his political career advanced. 
What Presidents William Jefferson Clinton and Barack Obama both have done 
so well is combine these elite academic backgrounds with the capacity to 
communicate with lay audiences. It is the magic potion for liberal politics. 
The situation is no different for liberal Justices trying to cultivate all of 
their audiences. Large portions of their audiences—if not most of their 
audiences—are not academics. This means that these audiences want to hear 
different things from the Justices. Unlike academic audiences, they are less 
concerned with the complexity of the Justices’ extrajudicial communications, 
and more concerned with their accessibility and relevance.41 Unlike for 
academic audiences, exclusion and exclusivity are not as important as practical 
implications explained comprehensibly.  
Communications with non-academic audiences will therefore tend to differ 
in location and content. Rather than taking place at universities, law schools, or 
elite bar associations, events will be at the kinds of places that are less 
exclusive—that are formally or functionally more open to the general public, or 
at least to a broader cross-section of individuals. In these settings, the content of 
the remarks by Justices will tend to differ as well. Speakers tend to self-
consciously and subconsciously change their remarks to fit their audience,42 
and so speaking to a less academic audience will produce less academic 
remarks. The combination of a more accessible location and more accessible 
content might also make for broader media coverage of these non-academic 
extrajudicial communications, thus multiplying the breadth and depth of the 
audience. 
                                                
40. See How Groups Voted in 2012, ROPER CENTER FOR PUB. OPINION RES., http://www 
.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/how_groups_voted/voted_12.html (last visited Mar. 1, 
2014). 
41. See, e.g., Robert D. Benford, “You Could be the Hundredth Monkey”: Collective Action Messages 
and Vocabularies of Motive Within the Nuclear Disarmament Group, 34 SOC. Q. 195 (1993) 
(noting that more accessible and relevant messages can be more motivating to groups). 
42. For general discussions of this, see, for instance, Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The 
Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 
117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1995); and Barry R. Schlenker & Michael F. Weigold, Interpersonal 
Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 133 (1992). 
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For liberal Justices, these non-academic audiences come in many forms. It 
is important to reach other parts of the “liberal legal network.”43 These other 
parts of the network include other legal elites, but legal elites without as much 
interest as academics in the big theory that dominates academic discussions. 
This includes organizations like the ACLU or the AFL-CIO. Other liberal elite 
audiences might be political elites, like Democratic members of Congress, who 
care about the Court, but usually do not care as much or as often about 
academic discussions.44 There are approximately one million lawyers in the 
United States,45 and most of them are supporters of the causes that liberal 
Justices support46 and could be motivated and persuaded to take up legal arms 
to support what these Justices are saying. The largest potential constituency for 
liberal Justices might be average members of the public, who are 
overwhelmingly supportive of liberal touchstones like Roe v. Wade47 and 
opposed to liberal villains like Citizens United.48  
Using extrajudicial communications to speak effectively to these audiences 
can persuade and motivate them in important ways. If elite legal interest 
groups like the ACLU support what Justices state, they might be more inclined 
to host the Justices for lectures or publicize their messages to their 
stakeholders. If members of Congress are convinced by what Justices state, 
they might be more inclined to introduce supportive legislation, hold 
supportive hearings, or give supportive speeches.  
As the scholarship about the public and the Court has demonstrated, the 
non-elite, average members of the public can also be helpful if motivated.  
They can convince their members of Congress or their President to nominate 
or support different judicial nominees, or even influence voting on 
constitutional issues by members of the political or judicial branches.  
                                                
43. TELES, supra note 2, at 22 (identifying the “liberal legal network” as including “the collection 
of individuals and organizations in the legal profession, law schools and public interest law 
groups”). 
44. Some members of Congress might be exceptions, and might take an interest in the 
theoretical debates on their own terms, rather than as windows into practical consequences 
of particular decisions. See, e.g., Glenn Thrush, Obama Doesn’t Want SCOTUS Fight, 
POLITICO (Apr. 10, 2010, 8:11 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35604.html 
(quoting Senator Charles Schumer saying that liberals most need “someone in the image of 
Justice Stevens who was well known as somebody who could influence other justices”). 
45. See, e.g., Lawyer Demographics, ABA (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam 
/aba/administrative/market_research/lawyer_demographics_2013.authcheckdam.pdf 
(reporting that there were 1,268,011 licensed lawyers in the United States in 2012). 
46. See, e.g., Lawyers/Law Firms, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org 
/industries/indus.php?ind=K01 (last visited Dec. 1, 2013) (listing law firm contributions to 
federal political candidates and political committees). 
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
48. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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Likewise, if this non-academic audience is more motivated, it can serve the 
interests of liberal Justices.  If elite legal interest groups are motivated, for 
example, they can serve as a “support structure” finding favorable clients and 
cases to bring to the Court to further the Justices’ pet causes.  If these groups—
or members of Congress—are motivated, they can also use what the Justices 
state to raise money and mobilize voters.49  
i i .  the academic’s  justices  
The past several liberal Justices have been mostly focused in their 
extrajudicial communications on academic audiences. This has meant that the 
public events they have received the most attention for have been at 
universities, particularly law schools, and at elite bar association gatherings. 
Their remarks in those settings—and their writings in other settings—have 
focused mostly on the technical, academic dimensions of the constitutional 
issues they address in their work on the Court. By focusing on academic 
audiences, other relevant and potentially helpful audiences have been 
neglected. 
A. The Academic Nature of Recent Liberal Justices 
The publicly affiliated liberal Justices of the past generation have had a 
significant voice and presence in the academic world of law. Justice John Paul 
Stevens, nominated by President Gerald Ford in 1975, became known as one of 
the liberal members of the Court.50 A former part-time law professor at the 
University of Chicago Law School, Justice Stevens was a frequent lecturer at 
bar association and law school events during his career.51 Right before and after 
his retirement, the content of these appearances became more provocative, 
because Justice Stevens addressed the technical errors of specific Court 
decisions52 or constitutional theories.53 Justice Stevens made many appearances 
                                                
49. See Post & Siegel, supra note 19, at 546 & n.11 (noting that “[o]riginalism remains even now 
a powerful vehicle for conservative mobilization”). 
50. One study found him to be the most liberal member of the Court circa 2003. See Keith T. 
Poole & Howard L. Rosenthal, The Unidimensional Supreme Court, VOTEVIEW.COM (July 10, 
2003), http://pooleandrosenthal.com/the_unidimensional_supreme_court.htm (describing 
Lawrence Sirovich, A Pattern Analysis of the Second Rehnquist U.S. Supreme Court, 100 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7432 (2003)). 
51. For a rather typical example of the type of event that Justice Stevens would speak at, see, for 
instance, ABA, American Legal Issues, C-SPAN (Aug. 6, 2005), http://www.c-span.org/video 
/?188425-1/american-legal-issues. 
52. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Justice (Ret.), U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks to the Brady Center to 
Prevent Handgun Violence (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo 
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to promote his book on the history of the Court,54 although these appearances 
were generally before bar associations and at law schools and not at events 
appealing to the general public.55 Justice Stevens also wrote several essays for 
the most academic of general publications, The New York Review of Books.56 
 After joining the decisive opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey57 
upholding Roe v. Wade, Justice David Souter, who had been appointed by 
President George H.W. Bush in 1990, became known as a member of the 
liberal wing of the Court.58 Justice Souter rarely attended public events of any 
sort, academic or otherwise.59 When he did appear in public or produce content 
for the public, his engagement was of a more academic nature. He was still the 
author of at least four academic articles before retiring from the Court in 
2009.60 After retiring, he delivered a “remarkable speech”61 at the Harvard 
University Commencement that received widespread attention for laying out a 
theory of constitutional interpretation. This speech was then printed in the 
Harvard Law Review.62 
                                                                                                                  
/speeches/JPS%20Speech(DC)_10-15-2012.pdf (addressing the constitutional dimensions of 
firearm regulation). 
53. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, Justice (Ret.), U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks to the American 
Constitution Society (June 14, 2013), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches 
/JPS%20Speech_6-14-13.pdf (addressing originalism and its applications to certain doctrinal 
areas). 
54. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR (2011). 
55. Justice Stevens did, however, appear on the Colbert Report. See Colbert Report: John Paul 
Stevens (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.colbertnation.com 
/articles/john-paul-stevens. 
56. For a complete list of his essays in this publication, see John Paul Stevens, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
http://www.nybooks.com/contributors/john-paul-stevens (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
57. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
58. See, e.g., Dan Coats, Anatomy of A Nomination: A Year Later, What Went Wrong, What Went 
Right and What We Can Learn from the Battles over Alito and Miers, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & 
POL’Y 405, 411 (2007) (featuring a Republican senator’s comment that “[s]ixteen years later, 
many senators who supported Souter’s nomination have been surprised and disappointed 
with his rulings and lack of judicial restraint”). 
59. See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Souter’s Class, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 3, 2010, 9:47 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/justice-souters-class (describing 
Souter as “this most private of public figures”). 
60. See David H. Souter, Gerald Gunther, 55 STAN. L. REV. 635 (2002); David H. Souter, Tribute 
to the Honorable Edward R. Becker, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1229 (2001); David H. Souter, In 
Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1997); David H. Souter, A Tribute to 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 104 YALE L.J. 5 (1994). 
61. E.J. Dionne Jr., David Souter vs. the Antonin Scalias, WASH. POST, June 3, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/02/AR2010060203496 
.html. 
62. See David H. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
429 (2010). 
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the next liberal Justice appointed to the 
Court, nominated in 1993, and her public profile, too, has been very academic. 
Before her nomination, Ginsburg was perhaps best known for her work 
litigating cases for the ACLU. She argued six cases before the Court and filed 
amicus briefs in many others,63 pushing new theories about how the 
Constitution should be interpreted to protect against gender discrimination.64 
These innovations in theoretical understandings of the Constitution’s 
treatment of gender became a part of the narrative surrounding her nomination 
and early years on the Court.65 Ginsburg was a faculty member at different law 
schools for nineteen years, writing about the technical dimensions of civil 
procedure66 as well as the constitutional dimensions of gender.67 She eventually 
became the first female tenured faculty member at Columbia.68 
Her public appearances while on the Court receiving the most attention 
have been at universities, law schools, and judicial conferences, and before bar 
associations or similar gatherings of lawyers.69 The arguments she has 
presented in these places mirror her public appearances while she was still a 
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
                                                
63. See Frank M. Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, Introduction of the Honorable Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg at the Eighth Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law and Public Service (Nov. 22, 1999), 
in Daniel Wathen & Barbara Riegelhaupt, The Speeches of Frank M. Coffin: A Sideline to 
Judging, 63 ME. L. REV. 467, 492 (2011). 
64. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution: The State of the Art, 4 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 143, 143-44 (1978) (“Not only the sex discrimination cases, but the cases on 
contraception, abortion, and illegitimacy as well, present various faces of a single issue: the 
roles women are to play in society. . . . This is a constitutional issue, . . . surely one of the 
most important in this final quarter of the twentieth century.”). For a helpful discussion of 
Ginsburg’s role in many of these debates, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex 
Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 63 (2013). 
65. See Richard Berke, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Clinton Picks a “Healer” With Few Detractors for the 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/20 
/weekinreview/june-13-19-ruth-bader-ginsburg-clinton-picks-healer-with-few-detractors 
-for.html (referencing Ginsburg’s “pathbreaking” work developing new theories of 
constitutional law in support of women’s rights).  
66. See, e.g., Ruth B. Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last In-Time 
Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Special 
Findings and Jury Unanimity in Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 256 (1965). 
67. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1975). 
68. See Martha Minow, Essays in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Introduction, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 423, 423 (2013). 
69. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the American Constitution Society (June 15, 
2012) http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/Remarks_for_ACS.pdf (noting 
major doctrinal issues the Court faces); Ruth Bader Ginsburg with Linda Greenhouse, A 
Conversation with Justice Ginsburg, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 283 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org 
/2013/03/01/ginsburg&greenhouse.html. 
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Circuit70: discussions about the role of gender in American constitutional 
doctrine71 and about general questions related to judicial behavior and the 
judicial role.72 During her time on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has either 
written or been interviewed for approximately ninety law review articles. 
Justice Stephen Breyer, appointed to the Court in 1994, was a law professor 
for thirteen years before his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit.73 Breyer’s interest in topics like administrative law led 
some to predict at the time of his nomination to the First Circuit that he would 
take an academic, technical approach to judging.74 During his time on the 
Court, Justice Breyer’s most notable public appearances have been prominent 
endowed lectures at universities, like the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at 
Harvard University,75 the Madison Lecture at New York University,76 or a 
series of lectures at Yale University.77 
Within a year of his nomination, Justice Breyer authored a book on risk 
regulation.78 He is also the primary author of an administrative law casebook.79 
His two more recent books80 were attempts to provide an alternative theory of 
                                                
70. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Women and the Law (1987), 
reprinted in In Her Own Words: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/15/us/the-supreme-court-in-her-own-words-ruth 
-bader-ginsburg.html. 
71. See Dahlia Lithwick, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Shows How Feminism Is Done. Again., SLATE (Aug. 
30, 2010, 6:59 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010 
/08/the_mother_of_all_grizzlies.html. 
72. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at Chautauqua (July 
29, 2013), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/RBG_Speech_Chautauqua 
_NY_7-29-13.pdf (speaking on opera and the law); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, 
U.S. Sup. Ct., The 20th Annual Leo and Berry Eizenstat Memorial Lecture: The Role of 
Dissenting Opinions (Oct. 21, 2007), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches 
/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_10-21-07.html. 
73. See Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European Constitutional Courts, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2000). 
74. See Ken I. Kersch, Justice Breyer’s Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (2006) 
(reviewing BREYER, supra note 4). 
75. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values at 
Harvard University: Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (Nov. 17-19, 
2004), http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/b/Breyer_2006.pdf. 
76. Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002). 
77. Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J. 1999 (2011). 
78. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 
(1993). 
79. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, 
TEXT, AND CASES (7th ed. 2011). 
80. BREYER, supra note 4; STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 
(2010) [hereinafter BREYER, MAKING]. 
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constitutional interpretation to that provided by Justice Scalia and others.81 
The two recent books were clearly attempts to appeal to a wider audience; his 
prior books were with Harvard University Press, while these two books were 
with more popular presses. 
Justice Breyer’s attempt in these two books to transcend his prior status as 
an Academic’s Justice was met with only limited success—at best. The two 
books address relatively academic topics (e.g., originalism and textualism), and 
were only reviewed in more highbrow newspapers and magazines82 and in law 
reviews.83 Justice Breyer appeared on a few more mainstream media outlets 
(PBS NewsHour and Fox Sunday Morning), but beyond that, he previewed and 
discussed the book mostly through his university and law school lectures. 
Elena Kagan, like Ginsburg and Breyer before her, had spent many years as 
a full-time academic—first as a law professor at the University of Chicago, then 
at Harvard, and then as the Dean at Harvard Law School. From the moment 
she first came to widespread public attention after her nomination, her 
academic background was part of the public narrative of her career. When she 
was nominated, the New York Times headline stated that President Obama had 
nominated “Kagan, Scholar But Not Judge, for Court Seat.”84 President Obama 
mentioned her skills as a professor and dean when introducing her to the 
media and the public at the White House.85 In her three years on the Court, 
Kagan has made notable appearances at Harvard Law School to speak and to 
                                                
81. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Take That, Nino, SLATE, Sept. 12, 2005, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2005/09/take_that_nino 
.html (describing Breyer’s book as comforting for “liberals who want their side to have a 
fighter in the ring with Scalia”); Jeffrey Rosen, Pragmatism Strikes Back, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/pragmatism-strikes-back 
-stephen-breyer-democracy-supreme-court (reviewing BREYER, MAKING, supra note 80) 
(describing Breyer’s second book as an attempt to respond to Scalia and address 
“liberals . . . still hungry for a constitutional vision”). 
82. See sources cited supra note 81.  
83. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 1675 (2006) 
(reviewing BREYER, supra note 4); Kersch, supra note 74 (reviewing BREYER, supra note 4); 
Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699 (2006) 
(reviewing BREYER, supra note 4); James E. Ryan, Does It Take A Theory? Originalism, Active 
Liberty, and Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623 (2006) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 4); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719 (2006) 
(reviewing BREYER, supra note 4).  
84. See Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Picks Kagan, Scholar But Not Judge, for Court Seat, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/us/politics/11court.html. 
85. See id.; Laura Meckler, Kagan’s Harvard Stint Could Be Selling Point, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704464704575208562540464720. 
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teach a class,86 at law school moot court competitions,87 and at the Aspen 
Institute to discuss constitutional theory.88  
B. The Limitations of Being an Academic’s Justice 
The academic audience, as Part I highlighted, is a crucial audience for 
liberal Justices, and thus it is important that recent liberal Justices have been 
appearing at academic locations and offering academic content. The academic 
audience might be frustrated with these Justices and desire a more “powerful” 
liberal voice,89 but these Justices are at least speaking their language. Because 
other audiences have gone relatively ignored, it has meant a less compelling 
message about what liberal Justices value in the Constitution for other 
audiences. 
If these other audiences are to be reached, then the location and content of 
extrajudicial communications by liberal Justices must be aligned with what 
these audiences can understand and appreciate. There must be what social 
movement scholars often call “frame alignment.”90 For audiences not 
persuaded by academic ideas, a non-academic message will be more 
compelling.  
Consider, for instance, the standard that President Obama set for his 
nominee to the Court before naming Sotomayor: “I view that quality of 
empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and struggles,” 
he said, “as an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and 
outcomes.”91 Delivered with millions of Americans watching—and millions 
more to read about it in the weeks and months to come—President Obama’s 
call for judging with “empathy” seemed more comprehensible for non-
academics than Justice Breyer’s “democratic pragmatism” or Justice Souter’s 
“fair reading of the Constitution.” Large majorities of Americans expressed 
                                                
86. See Back at Harvard Law, Kagan Reflects, HARV. L. SCH. (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www 
.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/alumni-pursuits/back-at-hls-justice-kagan-reflects.html.  
87. See, e.g., Cory Weinberg, Justice Kagan to Judge Moot Court Contest, GW HATCHET (May 16, 
2011), http://www.gwhatchet.com/2011/05/16/justice-kagan-to-judge-moot-court-contest. 
88. See, e.g., A Conversation with Elena Kagan, ASPEN INST. (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www 
.aspeninstitute.org/video/conversation-justice-elena-kagan-moderated-elliot-gerson.  
89. Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift or Shove the Supreme Court Left, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/01/weekinreview/01liptak.html (quoting former 
University of Chicago Law School Dean Geoffrey Stone). 
90. See David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464 (1986) (noting the importance of altering the 
message to reach and motivate different audiences). 
91. See Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by Another Name?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/politics/26memo.html.  
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their approval for the President’s “empathy” standard92 (even if Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan abandoned it during their hearings).93 No such 
majorities have endorsed any other message that liberals have produced about 
what judging means.94 
Crisp and memorable phrases are more persuasive to broader public 
audiences,95 and this is probably just as true in discussions about the 
Constitution. (One thinks of phrases like “[s]eparate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”96) Justices presenting remarks in academic settings or 
discussing academic topics are less likely to produce these talking points. 
Instead, remarks in these settings come off as more “lengthy, detailed and 
dense.”97  
The natural comparison is with conservative Justices, and the crisp phrases 
they have utilized to persuade. As Senator Al Franken said of conservatives 
compared to liberals: “[T]heir bumper sticker, . . . it’s one word: No. . . . Our 
bumper sticker has—it’s just way too many words. And it says, ‘Continued on 
next bumper sticker.’”98 Think of the phrases that have come from the mouths 
                                                
92. See, e.g., Eric Kleefeld, Poll: Public Overwhelmingly Says Sotomayor Not Racist, and Empathy Is 
Important, TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 5, 2009, 5:34 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo 
.com/dc/poll-public-overwhelmingly-says-sotomayor-not-racist-and-empathy-is-important 
(reporting nearly two to one support for the empathy standard). 
93. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 120 (2009) (statement of Sonia Sotomayor) (“I don't—wouldn't approach the issue 
of judging in the way the President does.”); Kagan Disregards Obama View on Empathy, 
LEGALTIMES (June 29, 2010, 12:51 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/kagan 
-disregards-obama-view-on-empathy.html (“As Justice Sonia Sotomayor did a year ago, 
Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan backed away today from President Barack Obama's 
statements about the role of empathy in judging.”). 
94. See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 356, 391-400 (2001). The empathy standard also persuaded and motivated 
academics to write about it. For examples, see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial 
Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944 (2012); and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy and 
Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629 (2010). 
95. See, e.g., Christ’l De Landtsheer, Phillippe De Vries & Dieter Vertessen, Political Impression 
Management: How Metaphors, Sound Bites, Appearance Effectiveness, and Personality Traits Can 
Win Elections, 7 J. POL. MKTG. 217 (2008). 
96. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
97. Guinier, supra note 9, at 9. 
98. Eric Kleefeld, Franken: Pro-Reform Bumper Stickers Have “Just Way Too Many Words,” 
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 28, 2010, 10:17 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com 
/2010/01/franken-pro-reform-bumper-stickers-have-just-way-too-many-words.php. 
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of conservatives outside of judicial opinions: Judging is like being an umpire.99 
One can be an originalist without being a nut.100  
For audiences not generally motivated by academic ideas, the academic 
location and content of the “Academic’s Justice” are hardly compelling. Part of 
evaluating the potency of a message for an audience is examining the resonance 
or salience of the message, or “how essential the beliefs, values, and ideas 
associated with group messages are to the lives of the targets of 
mobilization.”101 The deeper and more intensely felt the beliefs that the 
messages are targeting, the more effective they will be as tools of mobilization 
and coordination.102  
Messages about the Constitution framed in an academic fashion will not 
motivate the core selves and professional identities of non-academic audiences. 
For instance, the democratic pragmatism espoused by Justice Breyer is 
“context-specific, non-categorical, [and] expertise-driven.”103 Context-specific 
messages do not mobilize local members of the ACLU or NAACP to give 
millions of dollars or organize meetings or marches. If Justice Breyer’s 
expertise-driven vision of the Constitution is explained instead as a means of 
permitting minority students to have a chance at a decent education in the 
school districts in Parents Involved,104 the ACLU or NAACP’s local members 
might find themselves motivated. Justice Souter’s Harvard graduation speech 
about the importance of a “fair reading model”105 of the Constitution may not 
stimulate the core beliefs of civil rights organizations, members of Congress, or 
average Americans. If the alternative to that model is taking away the power of 
the elected branches of government to do their jobs, framing it in those terms 
might stimulate the core beliefs of members of Congress or the voters that 
elected them, and motivate them to take action. 
One reason that Justices on the left appeal less often to non-academic 
audiences is a perceived comparative disadvantage: They recognize the 
                                                
99. See Jeffrey Rosen, Promises, Promises, Promises, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www 
.newrepublic.com/article/politics/promises-promises-promises. 
100. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 103 
(2007) (quoting an often-repeated line from one of Justice Scalia’s speeches). 
101. See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 611, 652 (2000). 
102. For case studies making this point and drawing general conclusions, see, for example, 
William K. Carroll & Robert S. Ratner, Master Frames and Counter-Hegemony: Political 
Sensibilities in Contemporary Social Movements, 33 CAN. REV. SOC. ANTHROPOLOGY 407 
(1993). 
103. Richard Schragger, The Last Progressive: Justice Breyer, Heller, and “Judicial Judgment,” 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 283, 284 (2008) 
104. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 745 (2007). 
105. See Souter, supra note 62, at 430. 
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“particular knack for attracting and holding the attention of a nonlegal 
audience”106 that some conservative Justices like Justice Scalia have.107 Justice 
Scalia makes “every effort to insure his politically volatile statements are 
media-friendly,”108 and often speaks as if he is “explaining his constitutional 
views to laypersons.”109 Even his more academic book, A Matter of 
Interpretation, makes a point of saying that it “is addressed not just to lawyers 
but to . . . all thoughtful Americans,”110 and is written in more comprehensible 
language than either of Justice Breyer’s books.111 Chief Justice John Roberts 
used his confirmation hearing to introduce the easily intelligible and 
compelling analogy of judges as umpires,112 a phrase that on its own stimulated 
massive discussion in many quarters.113 
This comprehensibility means that conservative Justices are able to 
motivate using a “rare mix of legal analysis, emotional pique, and ideological 
fervor.”114 Justice Scalia speaks of originalism with the passion of someone who 
believes not only that originalism is right, but that it will “save us all.”115 He 
motivates by using “doses of mockery, humor, and insult” as well as 
“expressions of alarm.”116 Justices Scalia and Thomas both use originalism “as 
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[a] conscious tool[] to excite the anger, fears, and resentments of conservative 
constituencies, and thus to fan the fires of political mobilization.”117  
i i i .  the people’s  justice?   
In her first five years on the Court, Justice Sotomayor’s extrajudicial 
communications have been quite different than those of the recent liberal 
Justices. At times, the location and content of her communications have been 
academic. More prominent—and more notable, different, and promising for 
liberals—has been her constant capacity to communicate with non-academic 
audiences, to relate herself and the Constitution to lay audiences. The location 
and content of her extrajudicial appearances is what makes a more diverse 
range of audiences “like[] her, love[] her [and] regard[] her as one of the 
people.”118 
A. The Sotomayor Difference  
From time to time, there have been exceptions to the academic nature of 
the extrajudicial appearances by liberal Justices, particularly in the past few 
years.119 Justice Stevens generally avoided extrajudicial appearances outside of 
law schools and bar associations, but in more recent years has appeared on 60 
Minutes.120 Justice Ginsburg sat for several interviews with popular newspapers 
and television programs in the past few years.121 Justice Breyer promoted his 
books on television programs like the Charlie Rose Show, Fox News Sunday, and 
PBS NewsHour.122 Justice Kagan, while appearing at more academic locations 
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and talking about more academic topics, has tried to simplify the language she 
uses in her appearances—and in her opinions. This has led to many 
proclaiming her the future key liberal communicator on the Court.123  
Justice Sotomayor’s five years on the Court, though, have featured a more 
frequent pattern of extrajudicial communications clearly outside of the normal 
academic circles inhabited by liberal Justices. Justice Sotomayor has appeared 
at her fair share of elite law schools.124 At these appearances, though, the 
content of her remarks has been partially academic, but also partially personal. 
At her public interview at Northwestern University Law School, for instance, 
Justice Sotomayor remarked on how female judges are different by using 
anecdotes from her own confirmation process. She illustrated these remarks 
with a particularly vivid personal anecdote: She told a friend that the questions 
asked of her were so personal that she felt others “already know the color of my 
underwear.”125 When asked about how she approaches deciding cases, she 
indicated that having some “passion” for the cases and the parties involved in 
these cases is important.126 She did not discuss originalism or pragmatism in 
any great detail—but nor did she avoid touching on what judges do and how 
they should do it. She expressed her convictions in a more personal and 
accessible fashion, one less characterized by technical, inaccessible content. 
Contrast these comments by Sotomayor with the other liberal Justices’ 
appearances at elite law schools. Justice Breyer’s Yale lectures—the basis of his 
latest book—were almost entirely about different theories of constitutional 
interpretation.127 Justice Ginsburg’s Yale lectures this past year were about the 
role that gender should play in constitutional interpretation, but only 
occasionally mentioned the personal difficulties that Justice Ginsburg faced as a 
female lawyer earlier in her career.128 Justice Kagan’s interview with Dean 
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Martha Minow at Harvard Law School was a wide-ranging reflection on her 
career on and before the Court.129 
Justice Sotomayor has received substantial amounts of media attention for 
her extrajudicial appearances at events that are not geared towards academics, 
and instead are watched by a cross-section of millions of Americans. 
Sotomayor has talked with the women of The View (who called her “Sonia”), 
spoken to the hosts of The Today Show, and has been interviewed by Katie 
Couric, Oprah Winfrey, Jon Stewart, and Stephen Colbert.130 She has been 
featured in the more middle- or upper-brow strata of liberal media: 60 Minutes, 
National Public Radio, CNN, and C-SPAN.131 She made two appearances on a 
program that appeals to everyone: Sesame Street.132  
A similar pattern of appearing in accessible and non-academic locations has 
characterized her extrajudicial communications outside of the mass media. 
Immediately after her Senate confirmation, she made sure to be available in 
Manhattan to greet “neighbors who lined the sidewalks.”133 She threw out the 
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first pitch at a New York Yankees game134 and later greeted the Yankees in her 
chambers with the World Series trophy.135 She regularly appears at high 
schools and other educational institutions for children,136 and at universities 
beyond just the very elite schools.137 She appears at bookstores across the 
country.138 She regularly appears before groups of lawyers—particularly public 
interest groups—that are not the most elite groups of lawyers.139 
As with her appearances at elite law schools, these appearances can 
sometimes be purely personal, sometimes partly about the Constitution, and 
sometimes a combination of the two. During her 60 Minutes interview, for 
instance, she spoke of the importance of affirmative action by highlighting that 
it “changed the course of my life.”140  
A big part of Justice Sotomayor’s appearances at these other events is her 
unprecedented, headline-grabbing autobiography, published less than four 
years after her elevation to the Court.  This book was the number one book on 
the New York Times best-seller list for several months.141 This book was almost 
the opposite of an appearance at an elite academic institution—open to millions 
of Americans who purchased it from bookstores or Amazon. 
Like most of her extrajudicial communications, the book is targeted at a 
wider audience. Without mentioning specific academic phrases or debates, 
Sotomayor still does manage to make points that implicate some constitutional 
debates. Sotomayor argues that even minorities who feel the legal system is 
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against them, as she has at different points, should try to work within the 
system.142  
B. The Potential of Sotomayor as the People’s Justice  
1. Potential Contributions 
One difference that Justice Sotomayor could make is not to alter what 
liberal Justices are saying about the Constitution, but to attract more people to 
listen to what she—and the other liberal Justices—are already saying. She could 
become the People’s Justice by making the people pay more attention to 
existing debates about the Constitution and existing liberal arguments. Justice 
Sotomayor seemed to make this point in her interview with Jodi Kantor of the 
New York Times,143 and there are good reasons to think she might be right.  
Academic locations and academic content generally do not receive 
widespread attention,144 but Sotomayor’s appearances have been heavily 
covered. We know, for instance, that during high-salience moments for the 
Supreme Court, the American public tends to pay more attention to the work 
of the Court.145 One technique for heightening issue salience is making the 
issue more personal and immediate to the general public.146 Putting a face on 
an issue can give it higher salience.147  
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For many reasons—but surely in part because of her public appearances—
Sotomayor is the third-most-known Justice on the Court.148 Supreme Court 
reporters for major newspapers cover her, but so do culture reporters, 
entertainment reporters, and general news reporters, one of whom called 
Sotomayor “the nation’s most high-profile Hispanic figure.”149 For non-
academic audiences to be persuaded by liberal Justices, they must know who 
they are and what they are saying. Sotomayor’s pervasive fame could 
popularize the liberal constitutional product, and by popularizing the product 
it could persuade new audiences.  
There is another difference embedded in Sotomayor’s appeals to other 
audiences that could make a difference without changing the message of liberal 
Justices: Sotomayor could make the message of liberal Justices more appealing 
by affiliating it with an appealing messenger. How messages are received has to 
do with how appealing the messenger appears to the audience.150 The academic 
location and academic content of the extrajudicial communications by the other 
Justices might be more or less compelling, but it does not operate at the 
emotive, personal level that creates affection from the audience.151 
By contrast, Sotomayor has been appealing to a wide variety of audiences in 
part because of where she has made her public appearances. Appearances that 
are closer to the social and physical locations that feel like home to audiences—
that is, locations that are most socially and physically proximate to these 
audiences—can make a person more appealing.152 For instance, when 
Sotomayor visited the law school at the University of California, Berkeley, she 
judged a moot court competition and met with faculty and students there, 
appearing on the home turf of the academic audiences for liberal Justices. That 
same day, though, she went to an elementary school and met with local 
students, teachers, and parents, meeting them on their—quite different—home 
turf.  
Her presence at the law school might have made her, and therefore her 
message, more appealing to academics. Her presence at the elementary school 
might have made her, and therefore her message, more appealing to her other 
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audiences that day. The decision to appear in the home location of diverse 
audiences can make Sotomayor appealing and thereby persuade and motivate 
her audiences in a way purely theoretical messages cannot. 
Sotomayor has also been appealing to a wide variety of audiences because 
of what she says during her appearances. One way that speakers relate to 
audiences is by saying to them, “I am one of you.”153 Because Sotomayor makes 
her communications personal—disclosing her own life story and her own 
vulnerabilities—she seems like an average member of the public. Consider, for 
instance, her book, in which Sotomayor says that she has “ventured to write 
more intimately about my personal life than is customary for a member of the 
Supreme Court.”154 She describes herself as an “ordinary person”155 who knows 
she will be “judged as a human being.”156 She “disclose[s] every fear [she’d] 
ever had.”157 Sotomayor writes that she has “spent [her] whole life learning 
how to do things that were hard for [her.]”158  
Sotomayor makes similar comments during her public appearances. In an 
appearance at the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation, Sotomayor 
“open[ed] up about her diabetes” with “heartfelt remarks.”159 Her sometimes 
physical embrace of audience members accentuates this sense that Sotomayor 
can relate to these audiences of average people. She embraced Tabbie Major, 
age seven, at one public appearance when their conversation turned to Nancy 
Drew mysteries.160  
A common feature of her public appearances, then, is how much her 
audience responds positively to her in a personal fashion. One story 
summarizing the reaction to all of her public appearances said that, because of 
Sotomayor, “the Supreme Court appears to have a warm and motherly Oprah 
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type” because Sotomayor has “off-the-charts emotional intelligence.”161 The 
personal bonding that transpires between Sotomayor and her audiences makes 
her more appealing to a wider range of audiences. It might be that academic 
audiences prefer the dry, the complex, and the technical.162 It might be that 
personal bonding therefore turns academic audiences off from what Sotomayor 
says to her audiences, and makes them less likely to be persuaded by the 
substance of her remarks.   
At the same time, though, the more practical, comprehensible, and 
personal nature of her comments might make non-academic audiences 
appreciate her more, appreciation that might help to persuade them. This 
personal appreciation is a key component of persuasion for these less 
technocratic audiences.163 This personal appreciation is also a key component of 
motivation for less technocratic audiences—who may be motivated as much by 
the person behind an idea as by the idea itself.164 
Finally, Sotomayor could make a difference in her capacity as the People’s 
Justice if inhabiting that role transforms the content of liberal constitutional 
law. There is no reason, so far at least, to believe she will transform that 
content through explicitly academic or theoretical interventions. Unlike Justice 
Scalia’s originalism, Justice Breyer’s pragmatism, or even Justice Souter’s fair 
reading model, there is little in what she states in her extrajudicial remarks that 
indicates a brave new theory of the Court or the Constitution. 
What could make the liberal message different is not that it is materially 
different, but that it is delivered differently. The same message in a different 
package might become a different message. The same speech or book in the 
hands of the Academic’s Justice could read differently than it would in the 
hands of the People’s Justice. Messages that are particularly easy for non-
academic audiences to understand and appreciate could be particularly 
compelling. Lani Guinier, for instance, has argued that oral dissents are easier 
to understand and less technical, and therefore could be effective tools to 
communicate with the public.165  
The non-academic content of Sotomayor’s remarks might therefore be 
transforming the liberal message by popularizing it. Sotomayor’s extrajudicial 
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communications feature “evocative [and] plain-spoken prose.”166 Rather than 
talking about a “fair reading model”167 or the limited technical capacity of the 
judiciary to assess the policy outcomes of affirmative action programs,168 for 
example, she highlights how affirmative action uplifted her life and how she 
used it for the best.169  
This kind of extrajudicial communication is also more likely to mobilize 
non-academic audiences. For those concerned more about particular policies or 
particular outcomes than the theories or principles behind them, it can be 
frustrating when Justices only talk about underlying theories or principles. 
Some professors have assigned her book to undergraduate students as a way to 
motivate conversations about the Constitution.170 The NAACP can better 
mobilize its members to contribute by pointing to Sotomayor’s defense of 
affirmative action, rather than to the limited judicial capacity to evaluate the 
policy merits of affirmative action.  
2. Reactions to the People’s Justice  
In her first five years on the Court, Sotomayor has attracted considerable 
attention. The commentary on her tenure thus far—by academics and by 
journalists and public intellectuals—has not responded to her promise as a new 
and promising voice for liberal constitutional law. The commentary has 
focused on her failure to articulate liberal alternatives to conservative 
constitutional law. There is reason to believe this commentary may be right.  
There is also reason to believe this commentary might reflect what has 
happened in liberal circles as both a cause and an effect of the number of 
“Academic’s Justices”—namely, a failure to appreciate how liberal 
constitutional thought can be furthered even without being articulated in an 
academic fashion. Whether sympathetic or unsympathetic responses to this 
commentary prove to be more accurate will only be clear decades from now. 
Sotomayor’s extrajudicial appearances are not as obviously directed 
towards supporting a liberal vision of constitutional law as the extrajudicial 
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appearances of other liberal Justices. She usually talks about “her own story.”171 
She indicates that she will not “address any issue before the court.”172 She 
usually takes that to preclude discussion not only of specific cases, but also of 
the larger issues implicated by those cases. There are no remarks about 
originalism, or judicial restraint, in academic or in non-academic language. By 
some measures, then, Sotomayor is notable for how little she talks about these 
issues in extrajudicial appearances.173 
Nonetheless, there are discussions of constitutional law—and discussions 
sympathetic to liberals—in Sotomayor’s extrajudicial appearances. Justice 
Sotomayor does not mention the Warren Court’s “‘strict’ in theory, fatal in 
fact”174 approach when discussing affirmative action, for instance, but did 
praise how affirmative action affected her personally on 60 Minutes.175 She did 
not mention the flawed doctrinal apparatus of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion 
in Parents Involved, but she did state that his opinion reflected a “too simple” 
view of racial justice.176 During a recent NPR interview, Sotomayor referenced 
her disagreement with Justice Clarence Thomas (by name) about affirmative 
action.177  
Justice Sotomayor does not talk about living constitutionalism, but she 
does indicate the importance of considering realities on the ground.178 She did 
not criticize Citizens United for misunderstanding the history of the First 
Amendment, but she did say at Fordham that it is important to ensure popular 
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participation in the legal system.179 In her appearance at George Washington 
University, echoing her “Wise Latina” remarks, she highlighted the importance 
of diversity on the bench, and the importance of having defense or civil rights 
lawyers deciding cases too.180  
Rather than the signs of a Justice not speaking to substance, these are more 
indicative of a Justice speaking substance, but to a wider audience. One might 
look for discussions of constitutional law not only in the specific content of 
Sotomayor’s extrajudicial appearances, but also in the subtle message being 
conveyed. She references many of the cultural priors that appeal to liberals, 
even if she does not specify the programmatic content that might follow from 
these priors. For instance, while conservatives talk about color-blindness, 
Sotomayor highlights the discrimination she faced for being typecast as the 
emotional Latina181 and how it made her have to work harder to get to where 
she is.182  
Commentators might have missed these substantive dimensions to 
Sotomayor’s extrajudicial appearances for many reasons. Her discussions are 
not as open and obvious about substance as other appearances by liberal 
Justices. She does not use constitutional buzzwords (e.g., “living 
constitutionalism” or “originalism”). She does not appear at ideologically 
affiliated gatherings like Federalist Society or ACS conferences.  
Commentators might also miss how she talks about constitutional law 
because of their constant focus on what Justices can contribute to “the cause of 
progressive thought.”183 The primary metric used to evaluate the contribution of 
a Justice to public discussion about constitutional law by academics and 
commentators has been a more academic metric.184 If she has no distinctive 
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approach to “liberal thought,”185 then her value in communicating to the public 
is understood to be limited or zero. The contrast, so far, is with Justice Kagan, 
who has been praised for writing opinions that reflect and reinforce deep 
liberal theories, but also feature “pithy one-liners” that “brush away the 
legalistic smokescreens of justices on the opposing side.”186 The academic 
audience sees Kagan as the liberal counterweight, according to these scholars, 
to the “intelligence”187 of Justice Scalia.  
As this Essay has highlighted, though, there are more audiences for liberal 
Justices than just academics, and these audiences might actually respond more 
favorably to Sotomayor’s way of communicating substance. And readable 
judicial opinions will not reach as many individuals as readable opinions plus a 
Justice appearing on Oprah and The Today Show. 
Some have argued not just that Sotomayor contributes nothing to the 
“cause of progressive thought,” but that her approach of communicating to 
wider audiences is “undignified.”188 One scholar, for instance, criticized as 
“disrespectful” Justice Sotomayor’s decision to push back the swearing in of 
Vice President Biden so she could attend her signing at Barnes & Noble.189 
Whether these arguments are right about what it means to act judicially is a 
larger question, beyond the scope of this short Essay.  
Two quick comments are in order, though. Some research suggests that 
exposure to the “symbols” of judging leads lay observers to support judicial 
review even more.190 The capacity of lay observers to notice the difference 
between appearing at an elementary school and at a law school might not 
implicate concerns about acting unlike a judge. More to the point, there is also 
evidence suggesting that lay observers do not necessarily have the image of 
judges as detached, formalist, and unavailable.191 Bracketing the empirical 
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effects of Sotomayor’s extrajudicial appearances for one moment suggests a 
deeper truth: how strongly deviations from the detached, formal, unavailable 
judge are policed. The “persistent cultural script of judicial dispassion” is alive 
and well.192 
conclusion  
At the end of her fifth calendar year on the Supreme Court, Justice 
Sotomayor was not in her chambers, or at home. She was in Times Square in 
New York City, alongside Miley Cyrus, to lead the countdown to midnight and 
push the button to drop the ceremonial ball in Times Square. She became the 
first Justice ever to do this.193 This Essay highlights how these sorts of 
appearances are merely visible instances of a pervasive, and pervasively 
different, approach that Sotomayor has taken during her years on the Court. 
Right now, though, to say that this strategy will actually change how 
Americans perceive liberal Justices is merely “aspirational.”194 With time, and 
with more examination, a symposium at the end of Justice Sotomayor’s career 
might have the evidence to make a more definitive assessment. For now, 
though, we can simply assert that Sotomayor’s approach has been different, 
and there are many reasons to believe it could change how the liberal Justices 
on the Court communicate with the public. If this approach resonates, it could 
be that someday there will not just be a People’s Justice at One First Street, NE 
in Washington, but an entire People’s Court. 
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